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INTRODUCTION
Governments and firms in capitalist democracies increasingly use
automated processes to allocate punishments and rewards.' Some of the
most dynamic, profitable, and important companies in the information
economy provide these assessments. For example, Google orders
websites and advertisements; Internet service providers filter spain and
aspire to fast-track certain content. In finance, consumer credit scoring
determines who gets which loans, and credit-rating agencies can make or
break investment offerings. Reputation-scoring in general is becoming a
big business: companies now give scores to doctors and lawyers, landlords
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University Center for Information Technology Policy. I wish to thank Paul Ohm, Phil
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Morrison, Blake Reid, and other organizers of the 2010 Silicon Flatirons conference for
inviting me to participate, and to thank the Princeton University Center for Information
Technology Policy for hosting a talk where I was able to further develop the ideas in this
paper.
1. Felix Stalder, Autonomy and Control in the Era of Post-Privacy, 19 OPEN 78, 81-83
(2010) (describing a rise in automated processes using personalized data).
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and tenants, restaurants and hotels. The government has used "risk
scoring" in law enforcement and anti-terror contexts, and "audit flags"
help the IRS find suspect tax returns.2 All of these services utilize
automated processes to bring some order to vast amounts of
information.'
When automated social sorting first arose, it provoked widespread
anxiety.' To quell such fears, authorities tended to emphasize the
transparency and objectivity of the systems they used. A computer could
treat like cases alike, dispassionately. Anyone who doubted that could
"look under the hood" and see for themselves how the system operated.
Patent law, with its disclosure requirements, promoted such transparency
by conditioning intellectual property protection on publicly inspectable
written descriptions of claims.s
Over time, flaws in this transparency- and objectivity-based
approach to legitimating automated authority emerged. Shrewd or
malicious individuals who fully understood such systems could game
them. Concern over gaming provoked a shift away from transparency as
a legitimation strategy; instead, ironclad secrecy has been pursued. The
less the spammers, hackers, black-hat search engine optimizers,
terrorists, tax cheats, or manipulators know about the shape of a system,
2. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale III, Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1680390 (critiquing opacity of fusion
centers' public-private partnerships).
3. Search engines in particular use algorithmic authority, which "is the decision to
regard as authoritative an unmanaged process of extracting value from diverse, untrustworthy
sources, without any human standing beside the result saying 'Trust this because you trust
me.'" Clay Shirky, A Speculative Post on Algorythmic Authority, CLAY SHIRKY (Nov. 15, 2009,
4:06 PM) http://www.shirky.com/weblog/2009/11/a-speculative-post-on-the-idea-of-
algorithmic-authority. There are occasional manual interventions to change search results, but
the process is overwhelmingly automated via algorithms. Ira Basen, The Algorithm Method:
Programming Our Lives Away, GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 26, 2010, available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/the-algorithm-method-programming-
our-lives-away/artidel8l5869/print/ ("Most [algorithms] are what engineers call "black boxes"
- they convert inputs into outputs without revealing how they do it. The good ones are
enormously valuable. Google's is the spine of a business that currently generates about S28-
billion a year in revenues. Its secrets are not for sharing.").
4. See, e.g., David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies,
in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION
13, 13 (David Lyon ed., 2003) ("Abstract data, now including video, biometric, and genetic as
well as computerized administrative files, are manipulated to produce profiles and risk
categories in a liquid, networked system."); LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE
REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 48 (1986)
(describing responses to new technology's impact on social order).
5. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 541 (2009) (Patent law
requires an inventor to "disclose his invention to the public so that science can progress by
building on the divulged knowledge.").
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the better. An alternative form of intellectual property has encouraged
this strategy: trade secrecy effectively creates a property right in many
algorithms whose creators do not want to disclose them in patent
applications. Trade secrecy law also makes it all the more important to
keep algorithms secret: once they are disclosed, they lose trade secret
protection as a matter of law. State secrecy complements trade secrecy
law and provides even greater protection in areas where security is
critical, such as when national security is at stake.'
The move from legitimation-via-transparency to reassurance-via-
secrecy has profoundly troubling implications for the foundations of
social order in the information age. Few of us understand how our cars
work, but we can, in general, judge whether they have safely and
comfortably allowed us to drive to our destinations. We cannot so easily
judge the validity of a designation of a person as a bad credit risk, or a
website as irrelevant. In many cases, outside observers cannot even
understand the full array of commercial or political incentives for such
designations. Where it prevails, trade secrecy makes it practically
impossible to test whether these ratings are correct. The mere act of
designating someone as "certain to repay a loan" makes the likelihood of
repayment higher, because the highly rated individual will be more likely
to get additional credit to "roll over" any troublesome debts. Similarly, a
high ranking on search results can become a self-fulfilling prophecy of
relevance, as the highest-ranked sites use revenue from visitors to
improve the quality of their content.
Therefore, the spread of technology from machinery to social
sorting threatens to entrench self-fulfilling prophecies. Those at the top
of the heap succeed in large part due to their designation as likely to
succeed; those at the bottom may endure cascading disadvantages. This
is a particularly troubling outcome if the bases of such designations can
never be discovered, let alone adequately challenged and reviewed.
Unfortunately, the law is presently stacking the deck against
accountability for automated authorities. Data-gathering companies can
engage in a number of legal maneuvers to hide their actions or hamper
audits. For example, copyright protection is available for the original
selection and arrangement of databases,' and can in turn be
technologically reinforced by "anticircumvention measures" endorsed by
6. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of
Information Act, 115 YALE LJ. 628, 671 n.198 (2005) (describing a state secrets privilege that
can "deprive[] litigants of their right of access to court"); David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62
STAN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2010) (describing situations where citizens "are in the dark about the
fact that they are being kept in the dark.").
7. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON LEGAL PROTECTION FOR DATABASES
(1997), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/dbase.html.
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the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.' The law of trade secrecy allows
companies to recover damages from those who wrongfully disclose
confidential data and code.9 Finally, even where these forms of
intellectual property fail to protect given information and tools for
processing it, contractual restrictions can effectively "run with data" if
one can only access the data by consenting to an end user license
agreement. All of these tactics have been used to protect the intellectual
property of a number of business interests, and may even spread through
academia.'o
Recent public policy battles have sparked renewed attention to the
balance between secrecy and disclosure at large corporations. The
financial crisis has highlighted undisclosed risks of the largest financial
institutions and the confidential Federal Reserve interventions designed
to keep the banking system afloat after disruptive events in the fall of
2008. The implementation of electronic health records will raise
fascinating and difficult issues about the ownership and use of health
data.n Finally, Google's growing role in ordering the Web raises
fundamental questions about the proper scope of private initiative in
organizing and rationing access to knowledge. 12
In this thought piece, I will first explain why each of these three
sectors-health, general purpose search engines, and finance-risks
entrenching troubling trends by continuing down the path of excess
secrecy and data propertization. Just as the "fair use" doctrine has
deterred the overpropertization of expression, generally recognized fair
information practices should include large and powerful data holders'
obligation to surrender some sample of their data to entities entrusted to
audit and assess the data holders' activities." Objective audits will help
8. Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1119, 1120 (2007) (describing how the ability to exercise "physical control over the
use of copyrighted works may threaten intellectual freedom and fundamental liberties.").
9. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939); David S. Levine, Secrecy and
Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 192 (2007).
10. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC LIFE: A MORAL HISTORY OF A LATE
MODERN VOCATION 379 N.20 (2008) (listing critiques of the commercialization of the
academy).
11. See, e.g., Adele A. Waller & Oscar L. Alcantara, Ownership of Health Information in
the Information Age, 69 J. AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS'N 28, 28-38 (1998); Mark A. Hall
& Kevin A. Schulman, Ownership ofMedical Information, 301 JAMA 1282, 1282-1284 (2009);
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE NAT L COORDINATOR FOR
HEALTH INFO. TECH., RECOMMENDED REQUIREMENTS FOR ENHANCING DATA
QUALITY IN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS, 4-6 (2007).
12. Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future ofBooks in Cyberspace, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1308 (2010).
13. In other work, I have explored the related concept of "reciprocal transparency"; the
more an entity strives to learn about citizens, the more accountable its decision making should
be. Frank Pasquale, Data and Power: From Individual Consent to Societal Transparency 3-6
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restore confidence in automated authority.
I. UNHEALTHY SECRETS: PROPRIETARY PRICES AND
ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORD IMPLEMENTATION
Recent controversy over health insurance reform in the U.S. has
highlighted the defects of extant markets for medical products and
physician and hospital services. Due to public pressure for disclosure,
insurers in Massachusetts and California have recently revealed that they
pay very different prices for similar services.1 As health economist Uwe
Reinhardt observes, "Only a handful of Americans truly comprehend the
complex payment system for U.S. hospitals-mostly those whose job it is
to set, negotiate, and study hospital prices.""s The rise of a movement
advocating "consumer directed health reform" during the Bush
administration led to some small steps toward pricing transparency. Yet
trade secrecy law still enables obfuscation of critical data.'" Open
government laws are also failing to fully reveal what the public sector is
paying for health care. Even Medicare, a government program, has
resisted releasing certain payment data."
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ISP/PasqualeReciprocalTransparency.pdf; see Frank
Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet
Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. 105, 167 (2010) [hereinafter Beyond Innovation and
Competition] (discussing the power of the French agency CNIL to "require data controllers to
'ensure data security and confidentiality,' to 'accept on-site inspections by the CNIL,' and to
'reply to any request for information"').
14. Lucette Lagnado, Calfornia Hospitals Open Books, Showing Huge Price Differences,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2004, at Al; Frank Pasquale, Partners in Power, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Jan. 3, 2009, 09:00 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/01/partners-in-pow_1.html ("[I]n
procedures including coronary bypass, CT-scan of the chest, MRI of the brain, and
ultrasound, [the expensive hospitals] appear to offer no quality edge-just far higher prices.").
15. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of US. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy,
25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 57, 57-58 (2006).
16. Id. at 62 ("[A]ctual dollar payments [paid by insurers to hospitals] have traditionally
been kept as strict, proprietary trade secrets by both the hospitals and the insurers. Recently
Aetna announced that it will make public the actual payment rates it has negotiated with
physicians in the Cincinnati area. That this small, tentative step toward transparency made
national news speaks volumes about the state of price-transparency in U.S. health care. It
remains to be seen whether that first step will trigger a larger industrywide move toward
removing, at long last, the veil that has been draped for so long over the actual prices paid in
the U.S. health system."); see also Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices:
How Medical Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. LJ. 187, 188 (2009) (discussing recent claims by the medical device
manufacturer Guidant/Boston Scientific that the actual prices its hospital customers pay for
implantable devices, including cardiac pacemakers and defibrillators, are protectable as trade
secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
17. See Consumer's Checkbook Loses Appeal in Medicare Data Case, FINDLAW COMMON
LAW (Feb. 2, 2009), http://commonlaw.findlaw.com/2009/02/consumers-checkbook-loses-
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Classic economic theory directly relates the competitiveness of a
market to the degree of information available about the products and
services exchanged in it. However, health care is one of many areas where
intermediaries consider information gathering either a commodifiable
service in itself, or an aspect of their own competitive strategy. A
corporate giant like IMS Health can charge hundreds of thousands of
dollars for datasets, setting up a divide between researchers who have
access to critical information about, for example, pharmaceutical
prescribing patterns, and those who do not. Pharmaceutical companies
also push to keep exclusive access to their own data-even when serious
public health concerns arise about their products.
Health policy scholars have long demonstrated how difficult it is to
develop a "market" in health care.'" There is a "triple layer of agency"
between care and patients whose physicians' recommendations are often
constrained by an insurer which is chosen by the patient's employer or
government. Many other western countries have tried to address these
agency problems by establishing authoritative centers to gather
appeal-in-medicare-data-case.html. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that
Medicare releases a great deal of information at low costs, which might be ten to twenty times
more expensive in the hands of a company like IMS Health. See Mark Schoofs & Maurice
Tamman, In Medicare's Data Trove, Clues to Curing Cost Crisis, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2010, at
Al ("Federal investigators use the database to find fraud; academic researchers mine it to
compare the cost and utilization of various services; and consultants make a business out of
analyzing the data for a wide variety of health-care companies."); Kristin Madison,
Defragmenting Health Care Delivery Through Quality Reporting, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF
U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 87 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010). I have called
for more data development as a goal of health care policy in a recent essay on specialty
hospitals. Frank Pasquale, Ending the Specialty Hospital Wars: A Plea for Information-Forcing
Regulatory Design, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND
SOLUTIONS, supra at 235.
18. Donald R. Cohodes, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Musings on the
Regulation/Competition Dialogue, 7 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 54, 56 (1982) ("Medical care
has a number of characteristics that distinguish it from most other products . .. . [1] Medical
care services are not purchased from any desire for such services in themselves . . . [but instead
the] demand ... is derived from the 'demand' for good health.... [2] Medical care is only one
determinant of health status, and for most people at most times it is not even a very important
determinant. . . . [3] The need for medical care is unpredictable, requiring expenditures that
are irregular and of uncertain magnitude. . . . [4] The need for medical care is often
immediate, allowing little time for shopping around and seeking advice or alternatives.. . . [5]
Consumers are usually ignorant of their medical care needs. They cannot possibly obtain the
knowledge and training to diagnose their own medical care needs . . . . [And 6,] [p]hysicians,
though highly trained and better able to diagnose needs and prescribed treatment, also are
often uncertain about the appropriate services to provide."). FIRE industries (finance,
insurance, and real estate) share some of these qualities, making whatever transparency can be
provided all the more important. But see Omri Ben-Shahar, Frank & Bernice J. Greenberg
Professor of Law, Univ. of Chicago Law Sch., Ronald H. Coase Lecture in Law &
Economics: Myths of Consumer Protection: Information, Litigation, and Access (Feb. 17,
2009), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/node/426 (arguing that disclosure fails to improve
consumer decision making in a variety of fields).
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information (such as the National Institute for Clinical Excellence in
Britain). 19
Recent U.S. moves follow these steps in some small ways.20
Transparency has been on the agenda of reformers, and provisions
leveraging new federal powers over private health insurers require them
to release key data." The recently passed health insurance reform
legislation requires each state exchange to force "health plans seeking
certification as qualified health plans to submit to the Exchange ... and
make available to the public, accurate and timely disclosure" of a wide
variety of important information.22 The bill responds to the demands of
health policy experts like Karen Pollitz, who has repeatedly pointed out
the need for "rules to ensure that insurance products are understandable
and marketing practices are transparent and above board."23
Unfortunately, other developments in health information
technology threaten to undermine policies of openness. According to
Phillip Longman, the $20 billion allocated in the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (the "ARRA," also known as the "stimulus") to
subsidize health information technology could be directed to proprietary
systems that prevent widespread study and utilization of health records.24
Longman asserts that the "largest and most successful example of digital
19. Frank Pasquale, Rationing Health Care, British Style, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec.
3, 2008, 4:14 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/12/rationing-healt.html ("Britain's
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) is at the cutting edge of an
evidence-based movement aimed at reducing health care costs and getting value for money.").
20. Chris Fleming, New Health Affairs Issue: Comparative Effectiveness Research,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Oct. 5, 2010, 7:36 AM),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/10/05/new-health-affairs-issue-comparative-effectiveness-
research ("A national push on comparative effectiveness research is under way as a result of
federal stimulus and health reform legislation.").
21. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10104(0(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §
18031(e)(3)(A) (West 2010). This data includes "(i) Claims payment policies and practices[;]
(ii) Periodic financial disclosures[;] (iii) Data on enrollment[;] (iv) Data on disenrollment[;] (v)
Data on the number of claims that are denied[;]
(vi) Data on rating practices[;] (vii) Information on cost-sharing and payments with respect to
any out-of-network coverage[;] (viii) Information on enrollee and participant rights under this
title[;] (ix) Other information as determined appropriate by the Secretary." Id.
22. Id.
23. Making Health Care Work for American Families: Ensuring Affordable Coverage:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Health ofthe H Comm. On Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong.
5 (2009) (statement of Karen Pollitz, Research Professor, Georgetown University Health
Policy Institute); see also Matthew Holt Letters to Health-Care Santa: Free Our Data, EZRA
KLEIN (Dec. 23, 2009, 3:00 PM ET), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-
klein/2009/12/lettersto health-care-santa f 1.html ("We need health care organizations to
be transparent in their practices and for patients to have full access to their data as a matter of
course. One little amendment in conference could get us there.").
24. Phillip Longman, Code Red How Software Companies Could Screw UP Obama's Health
Care Reform, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2009, at 19.
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medicine is an open-source program called VistA," and contrasts it with
proprietary systems "written by software developers who are far removed
from the realities of practicing medicine."25 Longman worries that several
proprietary systems increase the chance of medical error due to restrictive
licensing agreements which prohibit users from revealing system
problems. 26
In an increasingly polarized health policy landscape, a rare
consensus has emerged around the need to deploy electronic medical
records ("EMRs"). Computational innovation may improve health care
by creating stores of data vastly superior to those used by traditional
medical research. But before patients and providers "buy in," they need to
know that medical privacy will be respected. Counterintuitively, trade
secrecy protections for companies that compile data may ultimately
undermine patients' privacy interests.
Many current discussions of EMRs erroneously conflate commercial
rationales for trade secrecy with patient privacy rationales for data
security. Secrecy supports "security via obscurity" strategies that can
ultimately compromise both patient privacy and the types of medical
research EMRs should be stimulating. For example, strong trade secrecy
protections may prevent patients from even finding out about data
breach-prone storage methods. If employers' uses of EMRs cannot be
scrutinized, they may be more likely to "develop complex scoring
algorithms based on [EMRs] to determine which individuals are likely to
be high-risk and high-cost workers."27 That use of data could shatter
already fragile trust in electronic health records systems.
Data lock-ups may also create scale-driven business models that
unduly tether medical research to ownership of large reservoirs of data.
As Longman notes, "Electronic medical records [should] produce a large
collection of digitized data that can be easily mined by managers and
researchers (without their having access to the patients' identities, which
are privacy protected) to discover what drugs, procedures, and devices
work and which are ineffective or even dangerous." 28 Legal scholars have
examined the trade-offs between data portability, standardization,
privacy, and innovation in EMRs. One key to policy success in the EMR
field will be distinguishing between raw data (which should be both
25. Id. at 21, 22.
26. Id. at 23. ("Perversely, license agreements usually bar users of proprietary health IT
systems from reporting dangerous bugs to other health care facilities. In open-source systems,
users learn from each other's mistakes; in proprietary ones, they're not even allowed to mention
them.").
27. Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health Records on the
Workplace, 19 KAN.J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 409, 422 (2010).
28. Longman, supra note 24, at 23.
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portable and, when properly anonymized, subject to academic research) 29
and its interpretation and organization (which are more justifiably
considered the intellectual property of a particular firm).30 EMR software
vendors can exploit a combination of trade secrecy law and licensing
agreements to "lock up" data in proprietary formats. If vendors of EMR
systems retain excessive control over patient data, many important forms
of research may be unduly limited.3 ' Scientists are already worried about
this trend of closed computation in the modeling of drug trials.32 For a
better sense of the dangers of such a trend, we need only examine its
impact in the realm of search engines and credit scoring.
29. Marc A. Rodwin, The Case for Public Ownership of Patient Data, 302 JAMA 86, 88
(2009). For a good discussion of laws regarding anonymization procedures, see Barbara Evans,
Ethical and Privacy Issues in Pharmacogenomic Research, in PHARMACOGENOMICS:
APPLICATIONS TO PATIENT CARE (Howard L. McLeod et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
30. For the benefits of such data analysis, see David M. Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine:
A Unified Approach, 24 HEALTH AFF. 9, 9-17 (2005); Walter F. Stewart et al., Bridging the
Inferential Gap: The Electronic Health Record and Clinical Evidence, 26 HEALTH AFF. W181
(2007).
31. Id. ("Unfortunately, billions of taxpayers' dollars are about to be poured into
expensive, inadequate proprietary software, thanks to a provision in the stimulus package. The
bill offers medical facilities as much as $64,000 per physician if they make 'meaningful use' of
'certified' health IT in the next year and a half, and punishes them with cuts to their Medicare
reimbursements if they don't do so by 2015. Obviously, doctors and health administrators are
under pressure to act soon. But what is the meaning of 'meaningful use'? And who determines
which products qualify? These questions are currently the subject of bitter political wrangling. .
. . Not only are [the Certification Commission for Healthcare Information Technology's]
standards notoriously lax, the group is also largely funded and staffed by the very industry
whose products it is supposed to certify. Giving it the authority over the field of health IT is
like letting a group controlled by Big Pharma determine which drugs are safe for the market.").
Meaningful use standards are now being developed by Health and Human Services, and
preliminary indications suggest they may be responding to concerns like those expressed by
Longman. See Jordan T. Cohen, CMS and HHS Release New Proposed Rules Governing Health
IT- Part 1: Overview ofProposed Rule on "Meaningful Use," HEALTH REFORM WATCH (Jan.
3, 2010), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2010/01/03/cms-and-hhs-release-new-
proposed-rules-governing-health-it---part-1-overview-of-proposed-rule-on-"meaningful-
use".
32. Jennifer Kahn, Modeling Human Drug Trials-Without the Humans, WIRED, Dec.
2009, at 156, 157, 194 ("In early 2004 . . . the American Diabetes Association asked a
physician and mathematician named David Eddy to run his own . .. trial [on atorvastatin]. He
would do it, though, without human test subjects, instead using a computer model he had
designed called Archimedes. The program was a kind of SimHealth: a vast compendium of
medical knowledge drawn from epidemiological data, clinical trials, and physician interviews,
which Eddy had laboriously translated into differential equations over the past decade. ...
Eddy's secretive habits are . . . troubling, according to David Nathan, director of the Diabetes
Center at Massachusetts General Hospital. 'If you listen to David, he has 10,000 variables and
differential equations describing everything from blood sugar to office furniture .... But it's
never quite clear what they are or how they interact. All the calculations happen inside a black
box. And that's a problem because there's no way to tell whether the model's underlying
assumptions are right.'").
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II. TRADE SECRECY AS A BUSINESS TOOL IN THE SEARCH
INDUSTRY
Trade secrecy law has focused on promoting "commercial ethics" in
markets. One of its central goals is to avoid wasteful or unfair
competition. For example, rather than triple-locking every vault or
biometrically assessing the credentials of all who seek access, a trade-
secret owner can bind employees, customers, and others not to
misappropriate or disclose valuable processes and products. A legal
entitlement to trade secrecy cuts down the costs that would be incurred
by zealous pursuit of "real secrecy."
Along with these benefits, trade secrecy has many costs.33 Secrecy
can impede incremental innovation, while the patent system's disclosure
requirements promote it.34 A smaller group of scholars has addressed the
negative consequences of trade secrecy for society, for example, a firm
might prevent health and safety regulators from adequately investigating
its practices or products by using trade secrecy protections to deflect
investigations.3 In the digital realm, another set of situations indicates
how excess trade secrecy can undermine the public good: namely, the
competitions sparked by search engine ranking.16 Opaque methods of
ranking and rating online entities make it difficult for those who feel
33. SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 81 (2004) ("Unlike all
other forms of intellectual property, trade-secret law allows owners to suppress knowledge.").
In rare cases, copyright may do the same, given the "secure deposit" exception to copyright's
deposit requirement.
34. While widespread disclosure destroys the property value of a trade secret, it is a
prerequisite for patent protection. The legitimate reasons for search engines' general emphasis
on keeping ranking algorithms confidential throw some light on the divergent rationales for
adopting patent or trade secrecy protection for any given instance of intellectual property.
While Google's foundational technology in search (the PageRank method) is patented, its
continual tweaking of search is usually not. Keeping the search algorithm private is the key to
defeating garners who might propagate link farms or other disfavored methods to gain salience
in search results.
35. Levine, supra note 9, at 170-77; Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical
Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1855-56 (1989).
36. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Joe Nocera, Stuck
in Google's Doghouse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2008, at C1 ("In the summer of 2006 ... Google
pulled the rug out from under [web business owner Dan Savage, who had come to rely on its
referrals to his page, Sourcetool]. . . . When Mr. Savage asked Google executives what the
problem was, he was told that Sourcetool's 'landing page quality' was low. Google had recently
changed the algorithm for choosing advertisements for prominent positions on Google search
pages, and Mr. Savage's site had been identified as one that didn't meet the algorithm's new
standards. ... Although the company never told Mr. Savage what, precisely, was wrong with
his landing page quality, it offered some suggestions for improvement, including running fewer
AdSense ads and manually typing in the addresses and phone numbers of the 600,000
companies in his directory, even though their Web sites were just a click away. At a cost of
several hundred thousand dollars, he made some of the changes Google suggested. No
improvement.").
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(and quite possibly are) wronged to press their case.
Google's secrecy about its website-ranking algorithm has provoked
investigations in Europe." The New York Times editorial page recently
called for similar scrutiny in the U.S." The stakes are high for those who
want to be found online. Search engines are referees in the millions of
contests for attention that take place on the Web each day. There are
dozens of entities that want to be the top result in response to a query
such as "sneakers," "best Thai restaurant," or "florist." For consultants, a
top or twentieth-ranked result can be the difference between lucrative
gigs and obscurity.
It may seem odd to characterize search results as a competition; they
are often thought of as a neutral map of the Web. However, the growing
"search engine optimization" industry reveals the pressures that
individuals and corporations experience as they struggle for salience in
results associated with certain queries." The primacy of dominant search
engines make them de facto sovereigns over important swaths of social
life.40 Both government agencies and public interest groups have begun
investigating the possibility that they are acting inconsistently with
relevant law or their stated missions.41 But these challenges and
investigations may never end conclusively given the secrecy at the core of
the companies' operations.42
For example, John Battelle tells the story of the owner of
37. Richard Waters, Unrest Over Google's Secret Formula, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 2010, at 22
("Prompted by three complaints, the European Commission this year began an informal
investigation, the first time that regulators have pried into the inner workings of the
technology that lies at the heart of Google.").
38. Editorial, The Google Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, at A30 ("[T]he potential
impact of Google's algorithm on the Internet economy is such that it is worth exploring ways
to ensure that the editorial policy guiding Google's tweaks is solely intended to improve the
quality of the results and not to help Google's other businesses.").
39. Frank Pasquale, The Troubling Trend Toward Trade Secrecy in Rankings and Ratings,
in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., forthcoming 2011).
40. DAVID STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN
ECONOMIC LIFE 1 (2009) ("Search is the watchword of the information age. Among the
many new information technologies that are reshaping work and daily life, perhaps none are
more empowering than the new technologies of search. . . . Whereas the steam engine, the
electrical turbine, the internal combustion engine, and the jet engine propelled the industrial
economy, search engines power the information economy.").
41. Waters, supra note 37.
42. Growing personalization also undermines efforts to understand how the algorithm
works. In late 2009, Google changed its algorithms so that even users not signed in to its
services would see "personalized results." As customization advances, only the search engineers
know who is seeing what results. See Frank Pasquale, 77e Deline fMedia Studies (and Pricy) in a
Search Engine Sciety, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 10, 2010, 7:11 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/07/the-decine-of-media-studies-and-
privacy-in-a-search-engine-society.html.
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2bigfeet.com (a seller of large-sized men's shoes), whose site was
knocked off the first page of Google's results for terms like "big shoes" by
a sudden algorithm shift in November of 2003, right before the
Christmas shopping season.43 Site owner Neil Moncrief attempted to
contact Google several times, but said he "never got a response.""
Google claimed that Moncrief may have hired a search engine optimizer
who ran afoul of its rules but it would not say precisely what those rules
were. 45 Like the IRS's unwillingness to disclose all of its "audit flags," the
company did not want to permit manipulators to gain too great an
understanding of how it detected their tactics. Search engine algorithms
are enormously complex, and sometimes embody artificial intelligence
that even their inventors have a difficult time fully understanding.46 Such
cyberdrift might be even more disturbing than deliberately manipulated
results. 47
Theoretically, plaintiffs could guess at what was being done by
search engines in particular cases, and subsequently algorithms could be
disclosed only to a court under a protective order.48But even in that best-
43. JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: How GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE
RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 154-59 (2005).
44. Id. at 157.
45. Id.
46. The difference between explanation and understanding is key here. See Georg
HENRIK VON WRIGHT, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING (Cornell paperbacks 2004)
(distinguishing natural and human sciences); Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data
Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete, WIRED, June 23, 2008, at 108-09 ("At the
petabyte scale, information is not a matter of simple three- and four-dimensional taxonomy
and order but of dimensionally agnostic statistics. It calls for an entirely different approach,
one that requires us to lose the tether of data as something that can be visualized in its totality.
It forces us to view data mathematically first and establish a context for it later.. . . Google's
founding philosophy is that we don't know why this page is better than that one: If the
statistics of incoming links say it is, that's good enough. No semantic or causal analysis is
required. That's why Google can translate languages without actually 'knowing' them (given
equal corpus data, Google can translate Klingon into Farsi as easily as it can translate French
into German).").
47. Jaron Lanier, One Half of a Manifesto, EDGE (Sept. 25, 2000),
http://www.edge.org/documents/archive/edge74.html ("There is a real chance that . . . the
ideology of cybernetic totalist intellectuals will be amplified from novelty into a force that
could cause suffering for millions of people."); JARON LANIER, YOU ARE NOT A GADGET 15
(2010) (article expressing concern over situations where "every element in the system-every
computer, every person, every bit-comes to depend on relentlessly detailed adherence to a
common standard, a common point of exchange.").
48. Protective orders may be issued in the discovery process "for good cause [in] order to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). Rule 26(c)(1)(G) specifies the issuance of a protective
order to structure the discovery of trade secrets: orders may be issued "requiring that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed
or be revealed only in a specified way." For a general discussion of trade secrets and protective
orders, see 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 5:33 (updated in Sept. 2008).
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case scenario, it is hard to imagine a court with the institutional
competence to understand whether a given set of results has been
manipulated. A more systematic institutional response is needed here-
perhaps a trusted advisory committee within the Federal Trade
Commission could help courts and agencies adjudicate coming
controversies over search engine practices.49 Qualified transparency here
would promote the development of what Christopher Kelty calls a
"recursive public"-one that is "vitally concerned with the material and
practical maintenance and modification of the technical, legal, practical,
and conceptual means of its own existence as a public." 0
Neither markets nor common law are likely to hold search engines
accountable under present circumstances. Oftentimes these
intermediaries operate at the hub of multi-sided markets. For example,
in a given situation where a Google user is searching for flowers nearby,
Google's search engine might block one florist for what it deems illicit
"search engine manipulation" (as defined by a trade-secret-protected
algorithm), but still deliver several relevant results. The searcher is
unlikely ever to know of the blockage, and advertisers that benefit from
increased patronage may be pleased by it. Though early search engine
prototypes that rested entirely on paid ads were quickly routed by more
objective sources of information, few are likely to detect or mind subtle
manipulation now. Given the trend toward dynamically personalized
search results, it is hard to imagine how monitoring could effectively
detect untoward conduct here. The blocked florist could detect that it
was blocked on its own computer, but would be unlikely to access a large
enough sample of search results to prove unfair treatment.s'
Reputations are created or destroyed, highlighted or obscured, by
search engines. Traditional restrictions on data and information flows-
be they in the form of privacy or intellectual property laws-inadequately
constrain these important intermediaries. In considering the balance of
power between search engines and those whom their actions affect,
scholars have focused on either strengthening or weakening extant
doctrines of copyright, trademark, contract, antitrust, and privacy law.
49. See Beyond Innovation and Competition, supra note 13, at 160 (proposing public and
private institutions for promoting qualified transparency to enhance accountability while
protecting intellectual property).
50. CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, TWO BITS: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE
SOFTWARE 3 (2008).
51. As customization advances, only the search engineers know who is seeing what
results. See Pasquale, supra note 42; but see Benjamin Edelman, Hard-Coding Bias in Google
"Algorithmic" Search Results (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.benedelman.org/hardcoding (making
a case that "Google's use of hard-coding and other adjustments to search results gives Google
an important advantage in any sector that requires or benefits from substantial algorithmic
search traffic," by analyzing various Web results).
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However, a critical mass of doctrine in these fields (along with
established patterns of consumer behavior and the advent of cloud
computing) has freed up so much information that the law needs to be
concerned not only with information aggregation, but also with rankings
and evaluations that flow from it. We should be troubled when trade
secrecy obscures the basis of these rankings.
III. CLANDESTINELY COMMENSURATING COMPUTING IN
CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING
New York Times business reporter Joe Nocera recently noted that
while a "credit score is derived after an information-gathering process
that is anything but rigorous," it "has become the only thing that matters
anymore to the banks and other institutions that underwrite
mortgages."52 Credit bureaus have also engaged in secret ranking and
scoring practices that jeopardize individual reputations. 53 They routinely
convert information into a single score purporting to assess the
creditworthiness of applicants for loans. Though a credit score is
computed via proprietary algorithms protected as trade secrets, it is
widely treated as a fair and objective evaluation of an individual's
creditworthiness.54 Revelation of such secrets can amount to a "taking,"
requiring government compensation for disclosure mandated by
regulators.s
After the subprime debacle, the social importance of credit scoring
52. Joe Nocera, Credit Score is the Tyrant in Lending, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, at B1.
53. Martha Poon, From New Deal Institutions to Capital Markets: Commercial Consumer
Risk Scores and the Making ofSubprime Mortgage Finance, 34 ACCT., ORG., & SOC'Y 654, 658
(2009) ("The strength of the bureau scores as risk management aids is that they give
competitive lending firms equal access to general snapshots of the consumer that are
continuously recalculated as new data is amassed from participating lenders. Such scores are by
no means produced from an 'ideal' data set. They are parasitic and pragmatic constructions
that make the most of information that is readily available at the bureaus as a resource for
manufacturing pre-packaged analytic products. These black-boxed statistical figures are in
large part 'behavioural scores'. They do not seek to qualify static qualities of the person so
much as they constitute a temporally responsive picture of consumer risk that is useful for
tracking a person's ongoing relationship to credit.").
54. Liz Pulliam Weston, Eight Secret Scores That Lenders Keep, MSN MONEY,
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/YourCreditRating/8SecretCreditScoresThatLe
ndersKeep.aspx?page=all (last updated Mar. 17, 2009) (describing "complex and largely secret
scoring systems").
55. Mandated disclosure destroys a trade secret, which can trigger obligations for
compensation. Robert K. Hur, Takings, Trade Secrets, and Tobacco: Mountain or Molebill?, 53
STAN. L. REV. 447, 489 (2000) ("[T]he common law's definition of trade secrets supports,
and the [Supreme] Court expressly approved, the intuitively appealing picture of a trade
secret's destruction being a per se taking, regardless of the economic impact on the underlying
knowledge.").
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(and its use by predatory lenders) has become more obvious than ever.s6
Nevertheless, the industry remains highly opaque, with scored
individuals unable to determine the consequences of late payments,
changes in location, or other decisions." At least one report has alleged
that credit scoring has negative, disparate impacts on minorities and low
income neighborhoods." Use of credit scores has been regulated by
forty-eight states.59 The National Fair Housing Alliance has criticized
them for possibly "disadvantag[ing] protected classes," arguing that the
"[i]ndustry's [1]ack of [t]ransparency [c]reates [flair [h]ousing
[cloncerns."60
The scores themselves may be self-flfilling prophecies, creating the
financial distress they claim merely to indicate.61 An individual's financial
situation should determine the score, but the causation may be the
reverse: the very act of designating certain persons or institutions likely
failures increases the likelihood of failure. If a scorer determines that one
missed $10 payment for a woman with two children earning $30,000 per
year lowers her credit score by 200 points, she will be more likely to
default because her low score means that she will be paying much more
in interest for any financing she can obtain. Since the scores are black
boxes, we have no assurance that scorers try to eliminate such
56. Poon, supra note 53, at 654 ("[O]nce modified by specific GSE interpretations the
calculative properties generated by these credit bureau scores reconfigured mortgage finance
into two parts: the conventional, risk-adverse, GSE conforming 'prime' and an infrastructurally
distinct, risk-avaricious, investment grade 'subprime."').
57. FRANK M. FITZGERALD, OFFICE OF FIN. &INS. SERV., THE USE OF INSURANCE
CREDIT SCORING IN AUTOMOBILE AND HOME OWNERS INSURANCE 24 (2002)
(discussing the "lack of adequate, detailed information that is made readily available to
consumers that allows them to determine if their insurance credit score and resulting insurance
premium is accurate").
58. BIRNY BIRNBAUM, INSURER'S USE OF CREDIT SCORING FOR HOMEOWNER'S
INSURANCE IN OHIO: A REPORT TO THE OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION 2 (2003)
("Based upon all the available information, it is our opinion that insurers' use of insurance
credit scoring for underwriting, rating, marketing and/or payment plan eligibility very likely
has a disparate impact on poor and minority populations in Ohio.").
59. NAMIC ONLINE, NAMIC's STATE LAWS AND LEGISLATIVE TRENDS: STATE
LAWS GOVERNING INSURANCE SCORING PRACTICES (2004),
http://www.namic.org/reports/credithistory/credithistory.asp.; see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 431:10C-207 (West 2010) ("No insurer shall base any standard or rating plan, in
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, upon a person's race, creed, ethnic extraction, age, sex,
length of driving experience, credit bureau rating, marital status, or physical handicap.").
60. Future ofHousing Finance: The Role ofPrivate Mortgage Insurance Before the Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 111th Cong. 6 (2010) (testimony of Deborah Goldberg); see also BIRNBAUM, supra
note 58, at 2 ("data and information strongly suggest insurers' use of credit has a disparate
impact on poor and minority populations").
61. Robert Berner & Chad Terhune, Linking Credit Scores to Hospital Care,
BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 1, 2008, at 80.
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endogenicity, or whether they profit from such self-fulfilling prophecies.
IV. FROM ENRON TO AIG: A DECADE OF UNREPRODUCIBLE
FINANCIAL RESULTS
While ordinary consumers are vulnerable to unaccountable x-rays of
their financial status, those at the top of the finance sector have used
opaque instruments to obscure the real bases of profits and bonuses.
Margaret Atwood's one-sentence description of the origins of the
subprime crisis highlights how opaque financial instruments created
unknown risks for investors and governments. In her Massey Lectures,
the Canadian novelist wrote that "[This] scheme . . . boils down to the
fact that some large financial institutions peddled mortgages to people
who could not possibly pay the monthly rates and then put this snake-oil
debt into cardboard boxes with impressive labels on them and sold them
to institutions and hedge funds that thought they were worth
something."62 As similar black boxes, ranging from off-balance-sheet
"special purpose vehicles" to "over the counter" derivatives, continue to
imperil the global economy, there will be increasing pressure for the
financial industry to adopt more principles of openness.
Murky relationships between leading bankers and regulators tend to
shield important transactions-and implicit governmental backing of
them-from public scrutiny.6 Banks that are "too big to fail" tend to
engage in transactions that are too sensitive to disclose. They also amass
the political leverage necessary to deflect demands for openness from
regulators and journalists.4
Many Washington regulators are swamped by information; for
example, "A Senate study in 2002 found that the SEC had managed to
fully review just 16 percent of the nearly 15,000 annual reports that
62. MARGARET ATWOOD, PAYBACK: DEBT AND THE SHADOW SIDE OF WEALTH 8
(2008).
63. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08 Civ.
9595) (alleging that key Fed programs "make [no] reference to any public disclosure of the
posted collateral or of the Fed's methods in valuing it" with respect to key lending programs);
see Greg Kaufmann, Friedmanism at the Fed, THE NATION, Mar. 15, 2010, at 18, 20
("Despite demands from Congress and the media, neither the Fed nor AIG disclosed the
names of the banks or the amount of money each had received through the bailout until
March 15, 2009, when AIG finally did so.").
64. Kevin Drum, Capital City, MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2010, available at
http://motherjones.com/print/31351 (during the 2008 election cycle, "The defense lobby ...
contributed S24 million to individuals and PACs . . . . The farm lobby? [It contributed] S65
million. Health care [firms contributed] ... S167 million. And the finance lobby? They're No.
1, . . . [having] contributed an astonishing S475 million during the 2008 election cycle.").
Drum concludes that "the finance lobby is, still, simply too big to fight." Id.
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companies submitted in the previous fiscal year; the recently disgraced
Enron hadn't been reviewed in a decade.""s Daniel Roth claims that
better access to financial information would give "everyone the tools to
track, analyze, and publicize financial machinations."66 As part of such a
data infrastructure, Professors Viral Acharya and Robert Engle argue
that "[d]erivative [tirades [s]hould [a]ll [b]e [t]ransparent."" Acharya
and Engle criticized derivatives regulation for not going far enough to
address these issues. The Dodd-Frank Act also fails to provide for
adequate disclosure of OTC derivatives.
Secrecy is a troubling linchpin of contemporary finance capital, even
though the size and interconnectedness of large financial institutions has
increased the fragility of the credit system as a whole. Information about
important transactions should be available to regulators instantly." The
larger a financial institution is, the more information it should be
required to share about its business practices, and the faster it should be
required to disclose them.70 Real-time reporting of all transactions to
65. Daniel Roth, Road Map for Financial Recovery: Radical Transparency Now!, WIRED,
Mar. 2009, at 80, 82.
66. Id. at 83.
67. Viral V. Acharya & Robert Engle, Derivatives Trades Should All Be Transparent,
WALL ST. J., May 15, 2009, at A13 ("Most financial contracts are arrangements between two
parties to deliver goods or cash in amounts and at times that depend upon uncertain future
events. By their nature, they entail risk, but one kind of risk - 'counterparty risk' - can be
difficult to evaluate, because the information needed to evaluate it is generally not public. Put
simply, a party to a financial contract might sign a second, similar financial contract with
someone else - increasing the risk that it may be unable to meet its obligations on the first
contract. So the actual risk on one deal depends on what other deals are being done. But in
over-the-counter (OTC) markets - in which parties trade privately with each other rather
than through a centralized exchange - it is not at all transparent what other deals are being
done. This makes it likely that some institutions will build up excessively large positions in
OTC derivatives without the full knowledge of other market participants. If these institutions
were to default, their counterparties would also incur significant losses, creating a systemic
risk.").
68. Wallace C. Turberville, Derivatives Clearing: At the End ofthe Beginning, NEW DEAL
2.0 (Aug. 23, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.newdeal20.org/2010/08/23/derivatives-dearing-
at-the-end-of-the-beginning-18210.
69. Real Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction and Pricing Data, 75 Fed Reg.
76,140, 76,930 (proposed Dec. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 43) ("The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ('Commission') is proposing rules to require public reporting of
certain swap transaction pricing and volume data and to establish a procedure for determining
appropriate minimum sizes for block trades and large notional swap transactions.").
70. The new Office of Financial Research should promote these goals. For background
on the office, see JENNIFER S. TAUB, GREAT EXPECTATIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF
FINANCIAL RESEARCH 1 ("The Office of Financial Research ("OFR") is a rarely-discussed
but potentially powerful agency established by the Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 ("Dodd-Frank"). Often compared to a storm-warning system, the
OFR, through its two units, a Data Center and a Research and Analysis Center, can
continually gather up and analyze detailed financial information collected from a variety of
banks and other financial firms.").
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some limited group of federal officials may well be required." A systemic
risk regulator needs a complete and current picture of the overall level of
debt, wealth, and risk in an economy.72
Though the rise of the "shadow banking system" and "dark pools"
may make its spread inevitable, trade secrecy appears inappropriate when
a Gordian knot of gambles can put the entire global financial system at
risk. As Stephen Mihm has noted, "a web of extraordinarily complex
securities and wagers that has made the world's financial system so
opaque and entangled that even many experts confess that they no longer
understand how it works."73 Some systemic risk regulator should be given
critical information in real time. 74 Transparency would also help global
regulators clamp down on the trillion dollars of funds lost each year to
tax authorities in the developing world due to illicit financial flows. 75
CONCLUSION
Many current public policy battles concern the balance between
71. For a fuller exploration of "qualified transparency" in another regulatory context, see
Beyond Innovation and Competition, supra note 13. The Securities and Exchange Commission
has begun a program of intensified market surveillance. Press Release, Sec. and Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Proposes Consolidated Audit Trail System to Better Track Market Trades
(May 26, 2010) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-86.htm (Proposing a
rule to "establish a consolidated audit trail system that would enable regulators to track
information related to trading orders received and executed across the securities markets.").
72. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 111-123. (2010) (establishing a Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC"), a ten
member board chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and composed mainly of the heads of
federal economic agencies). The FSOC's purpose is "to identify risks to the financial stability
of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure" or large
bank and non-bank financial companies. Id. § 112(a)(1)(A); see also SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND
INSIGHTS 21 (2010).
73. Stephen Mihm, The Black Box Economy, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2008, at El
(describing an "immense shadow economy of novel and poorly understood financial
instruments created by hedge funds and investment banks over the past decade" as "a deep[]
change in the financial system that may leave regulators, and even Congress, powerless when
they try to wield their usual tools" to address economic crisis.).
74. Mike Masnick, Garbage In ... Radical Transparency Out?, TECHDIRT (Feb. 24, 2009,
02:34 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090224/0023453876.shtml (asking "how the
various quants on Wall Street got so suckered into believing their risk models that didn't take
into account the idea that mortgage defaults weren't necessarily independent events," and
concluding that "[elven if people know that a computer model is 'just a model,' it leads to
situations where they just rely on the computer because the computer said so - not taking into
account its obvious faults").
75. RAYMOND BAKER, CAPITALISM'S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY AND HOW
TO RENEW THE FREE MARKET SYSTEM 23-24 (2005); see also Hilaire Avril, Political Elites
Ensure Continuing Flight of Dirty Money, IPS (Sept. 16, 2009),
http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=48460 (describing a definitive study of "illicit
financial flows from developing countries [estimated at] a trillion dollars a year").
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secrecy and disclosure at large corporations. The financial crisis has
turned public attention to the undisclosed risks on the balance books of
the largest banks and the confidential Federal Reserve interventions that
kept the banking system afloat during the crisis of 2008. Secret and
unfair pricing practices by hospitals and insurers pose a major challenge
for the implementation of health care reform. Key intermediaries in the
financial, health, and information sectors play a role in today's economy
akin to that of the great trusts which originally inspired the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, making or breaking the economic fates of many
individuals. As novelist Adam Haslett put it, they are the "master[s] of
conditions others merely suffer[]."7
Consultants frequently tell academics that they are obliged to
become more "corporate" in outlook-to pay more attention to the
bottom line and to develop more proprietary products and services. 7
These pressures are particularly intense in fields with immediate
commercial relevance. However, certain principles of openness derived
from traditional science and academic life might end up serving the long-
term economic interests of American industries.78 While the university
can learn from the for-profit corporation, governments regulating
intermediaries should also learn from the openness principles of
universities. For example, Victoria Stodden has argued that, in the case
of computational scientific research, "results should be independently
replicable," otherwise, science cannot progress." Similarly, sequential
innovation in the private sector relies on later "improvers" being able to
stand on the shoulders of earlier innovators.so Trade secrecy threatens to
76. ADAM HASLETT, UNION ATLANTIC 162 (2010).
77. JAMES C. GARLAND, SAVING ALMA MATER: A RESCUE PLAN FOR AMERICA'S
PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES 199-200 (2009) (claiming that universities need to become more
efficient and should be "deregulated," with revenues tied to "performance"); GAYE
TUCHMAN, WANNABE U: INSIDE THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY (2009) (observing and
critiquing trends toward academic corporatization).
78. See, e.g., Victoria Stodden, Enabling Reproducible Research: Licensing for Scientific
Innovation, INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 2, 2 (2009) ("[P]revailing scientific norms ...
provide both that results be replicated before accepted as knowledge, and that scientific
understanding be built upon previous discoveries for which authorship recognition is given.").
Patent law's disclosure requirement reflects such scientific standards; trade secrecy dispenses
with them. See also Victoria Stodden et al., Reproducible Research, 12 COMPUTING SCI. &
ENGINEERING 8, 8 (2010) (I was a contributing author for this proposal.).
79. Stodden, supra note 78, at 8. As she notes in the article, the OECD's Istanbul
Declaration "call[ed] for governments to make their data freely available online as a 'public
good.'" Id. Given extensive government support for the finance and health care industries, it is
appropriate for public authorities to impose openness requirements on firms in many situations
as a condition for future support.
80. SCOTCHMER, supra note 33, at 156 ("When innovation is cumulative, an important
incentive problem is to ensure that each innovator is rewarded enough to take account of the
benefits conferred on future innovators. The future innovators may, in fact, be the original
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nip that process in the bud, siloing innovation in search, health care, and
finance into the firms best able to create authoritative data stores. There
is no necessary relationship between being the best data-gatherer and
finding the best interpretations and applications of that data.
Globalization accelerates competition and stratification within and
among economies. A power law distribution of cultural, political, and
economic inequality can only be legitimated by democracy, markets, or
some combination of the two." Such forms of spontaneous coordination
are perceived as fair because they are governed by knowable rules: a
majority or plurality of votes wins, as does the highest bidder. Yet our
markets, research, and life online are increasingly mediated by
institutions that suffer serious transparency deficits. When a private
entity grows important enough, it should be subject to transparency
requirements that reflect its centrality.82 The increasing intertwining of
governmental, business, and academic entities should provide some
leverage for public-spirited appropriators and policymakers to insist on
more general openness."
Laws promoting transparency have shed some light on troubling
practices. However, new automated authorities are often so complex that
merely revealing them will not solve the problems discussed above.
Transparency should be a first step toward an intelligible society, where
leading firms' critical decisions can be understood not merely by their
own engineers and mathematicians, but also by risk managers and
regulators. However well an "invisible hand" coordinates economic
activity generally, markets depend on reliable information about the
practices of core firms that finance, rank, and rate entities in the rest of
the economy. Brandishing quasi-governmental authority to determine
which enterprises are funded and found, they need to be held to a higher
standard than the average firm.
innovator's rivals.").
81. For a leading attempt to provide such a justification, see YOcHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM (2006). For a critique of Benkler's optimism here, see Oren Bracha & Frank
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, andAccountability in the Law ofSearch, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008).
82. The Freedom of Information Act only applies to the government, but given private
companies' increasingly governmental role in today's society, it is time to consider applying
some of its strictures to key private sector entities. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 9; ALASDAIR
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